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INTRODUCTION  
The United States has never been a world leader in social policy initiatives, and 
assistance to the poor is no exception.  This regard of the U.S. government evolves, in 
part, from America’s historical values of limited government and personal responsibility 
(Belz, 1992).  Social policy for the poor in the United States has traditionally relied on 
less than generous income maintenance programs accompanied by asset limits.  
Nevertheless, social policy proposals in the last decade have witnessed the 
emergence of more investment–oriented policy strategies.  For example, Sherraden’s 
(1991) work on asset-based welfare proposes policy that aids and encourages saving and 
asset accumulation among the poor, under the assumption that acquisition and ownership 
of assets improve economic, psychological, and social well-being.   
Although current welfare programs serve as a partial safety net by providing for 
the immediate needs of the poor, they are intended only for short-term maintenance and 
are not designed to lift people out of poverty.  In order to rise out of poverty and keep 
from falling back in, poor people have to achieve and maintain long-term financial 
security.  Asset-based welfare is a developmental approach that may keep people from 
becoming impoverished as well as providing an opportunity out of poverty by offering 
mechanisms that help poor people save and build assets.  Moreover, because assets can 
be passed on to children and other family members, the financial security of future 
generations may be improved.  Approximately one-half of wealth first reaches its owners 
through intergenerational transfers, but almost none of this wealth reaches poor 
households (Wilhelm, 2001).  Some researchers claim that the percentage of wealth 
accumulation due to intergenerational transfers—specifically in the form of inheritance 
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and gifts—is close to 80 percent (see Olive and Shapiro, 1997).  The amount of asset 
accumulation in households also varies depending on several individual characteristics 
including age, earnings, family size and composition, race and one’s level of education.  
Another important influence in individual asset accumulation may be formal 
institutions.  However, the study of institutions as a predictor of asset accumulation is 
only starting to emerge.  Although a larger body of institutional theory exists that focuses 
on the influence of societal institutions on individual behaviors and outcomes (e.g., 
Gordon, 1980; Green, 1991; Neale, 1987), there is very little research that explicitly 
connects institutions to individual asset or wealth accumulation.  Yet, according to Neale 
(1987), “motives lead people to engage in particular activities, but what they do and how 
they do it depend upon the structure of institutions” (p.1188).  In essence, people make 
choices based on their own preferences, but their choices are shaped by the rules and 
norms of institutions.   
This paper contributes to the emerging research on the role of institutions in 
individual asset and wealth accumulation.  It provides a closer examination of the 
institutional theory of saving as an important framework that may help explain the saving 
performance and asset accumulation of low-income households in the United States.   
Specifically, the paper answers the following key question: Controlling for income and 
several measurable individual characteristics, do institutions matter in influencing the 
saving behavior and asset accumulation of low-income households? 
BACKGROUND 
The institutional theory of saving suggests that institutional factors greatly 
influence individual’s ability to save.  According to this theory, saving and asset 
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accumulation are primarily a result of institutional arrangements that involve explicit 
connections, rules, incentives and subsidies (Sherraden, 1991).  Several theorists maintain 
that institutions matter in shaping and influencing opportunities and behaviors (see Neale 
1987; North 1990; Sherraden, 1991; Weaver and Rockman 1993; Beverly and Sherraden 
1999; Peters, 1999).  This suggested link between institutions and financial well-being 
may have important implications in social policy.  For example, Sherraden (1991) 
observes, the middle-class “participates in retirement pension systems … not [as] a 
matter of making superior choices.  Instead, a priori choices are made by social policy, 
and individuals walk into the pattern than has been established” (p.127).  Given the 
premise of institutional theory, this paper posits that low-income households are not able 
to save and accumulate assets primarily because they do not have the same institutional 
opportunities that higher-income households receive.  Otherwise, provided with access to 
the same institutional frameworks that their higher-income counterparts utilize, low-
income households might be in position to save and accumulate assets.  It is against this 
background that the institutional question in this paper is being addressed.  
The answer to the above institutional question is important for at least two 
reasons: First, one would be justified to argue that because saving is hard for most 
people, it is even harder for those with low incomes.  Therefore, the ability to clarify the 
role of formal institutions in facilitating the saving performance and asset accumulation 
of low-income households would be a step in the right direction. This clarification may 
help initiate the move toward more inclusive social policy and program proposals which 
could provide low-income households with the same opportunities to participate in 
saving and asset accumulation programs as their higher-income counterparts.  Second, 
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given the on-going discussion in the policy arena about an ownership society, which 
includes low-income households (Boshara, R., Cramer, R., & Parrish, L., 2005), results 
from this study may contribute to the debate by providing knowledge on how programs 
and policies toward an ownership society could be structured, tested and implemented.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Traditional Theories of Saving 
Two of the more recognized economic theories of saving are: (1) the life-cycle 
hypothesis (LHC) (Ando & Modigliani, 1963; Modigliani & Ando, 1957; Modigliani & 
Brumberg, 1954) and, (2) the permanent-income hypothesis (Friedman, 1957).  These 
theories view savings as a way of balancing the fluctuation of household resources for 
consumption throughout a lifetime, suggesting that when income is greater than 
consumption, individuals save, and when income is less than consumption, individuals 
dissave.  The LHC, for example, assumes that consumption and saving patterns reflect an 
individual’s age or stage within the life cycle, with a significant amount of saving 
occurring in the middle years.   
In addition to the economic theories mentioned above, there are the socio-
psychological theories of saving (Cohen, 1994; Duesenberry, 1949; Katona, 1975).  
These theories posit that individual’s preferences change in response to economic and 
social variations.   
Although there is reason to believe that saving is an attribute of individual traits, 
preferences and income relative to consumption, studies have begun to arise explicitly 
acknowledging the role of formal institutional mechanisms in influencing the saving 
performance of individuals.  In other words, individual attributes and income may not be 
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enough in explaining the saving behavior of individuals.  Institutions—in the form of 
policies and programs—may be equally important. 1
The Role of Institutions in the United States 
Values and beliefs are often incorporated into institutions that guide societies 
along certain economic, political, and ideological paths (Hall & Taylor, 1996).  Because 
formal institutions in the public sector are governed by the political structures within a 
nation, institutional choices play a critical role in the welfare of a nation’s citizens, 
particularly their financial well-being.  In the United States, the guiding principles are 
based on a democratic-capitalist government that has traditionally supported financial 
growth through personal ownership and open competition (Hill & Hill, 2001).  The idea 
of financial security through the investment and growth of personal assets is an 
established and familiar concept in the United States.   
Throughout U.S. history, the government has played an active role in encouraging 
citizens to accumulate assets, most often by offering incentives through the tax system.  
For example, the Homestead Act of 1852 was one of the first major asset-building 
policies in the United States.  Under minimal conditions, this Act provided 160 acres of 
land to citizens of the United States.  In 1913 as part of the establishment of income 
taxes, deductions for home mortgage interest and property taxes were established.  In 
recent years, tax subsidies have been offered for pension plan contributions such as the 
exclusion of employment-sponsored pension plan contributions and earnings and the 
deferment of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and Keogh Plans.  Consequently, 
                                                 
1 In this paper, the term "institution" is used in a particular sense of formal policy and program 
arrangements. The usage does not include informal social arrangements or social norms. We take this focus 
because it has direct public policy implications. That is the purpose of this applied research. Thus, our 
theoretical perspective is purposefully selected for both intellectual and applied reasons. 
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the influence of institutions in public policy has the ability to make considerable changes 
in the well-being of individuals.  And although the poor are not deliberately excluded 
from these benefits, their access is limited, greatly narrowing their participation 
opportunities (Howard, 1997; Sherraden, 1991, 2001; Seidman, 2001).   
Institutional Theory of Saving 
The institutional theory of saving recognizes the important role that institutions 
play in savings.  It advances five institutional constructs as being instrumental in 
predicting individual saving and asset accumulation, particularly among low-income 
households: 1) access, 2) information, 3) incentives, 4) facilitation, and 5) expectations 
(Sherraden, 1991; Beverly and Sherraden, 1999; Sherraden, 1999; Sherraden et al., 
2003). 
   Access.  Access to institutional mechanisms that make the depositing process 
more available may have an impact on asset accumulation.  When access to these means 
is permitted, savings rates are likely to be higher.  Some researchers (Cagan, 1965; 
Carroll & Summers, 1987) suggest that the availability of institutionalized saving 
opportunities encourages savings because it brings about an awareness of the need for 
and benefits of saving.   
Information.  Another important institutional determinant of saving is financial 
information, normally offered through financial education.  The assertion here is that 
when people are made more aware of their saving options and outcomes, savings will be 
higher.  Often financial education is provided to employees whose companies offer 
pension plans.  Studies report that when financial education is offered to employees, 
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participation levels, as well as contribution levels in some cases, are higher (Bayer, 
Bernheim, & Scholz, 1996; Bernheim & Garrett, 1996).   
Incentives.  Incentives are inducements to motivate higher savings.  Interest rates 
and rates of return on investments are the most familiar.  Although empirical evidence 
concerning the effects of incentives is inconsistent (see Engen, Gale & Scholz, 1996; 
Hubbard & Skinner, 1996; Poterba, Venti & Wise, 1996), the proposition is that, 
generally, an increase in the rate of return will cause an increase in savings.  
Facilitation.  These are institutional arrangements that provide mechanisms that 
make saving more manageable and convenient.  Empirical evidence on facilitation is 
limited at this time.  But overall, the proposition is that these arrangements will more 
likely increase individual savings.  One study on 401(k) participation finds participation 
and contributions rates to be higher after the employer started automatically enrolling 
employees into the 401(k) plans (Madrian & Shea, 2000).   
Expectations.  Expectations, as an institutional determinant of saving, refer to the 
specific saving goals, targets and rules communicated to participants by the programs.  
Individuals with specific saving expectations are more likely to save more than 
individuals with no saving expectations.   
Based on this theory, Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) were developed 
as a policy initiative that could help provide poor people with the opportunity to save 
money (Sherraden, 1990; 1991).  These programs—in line with institutional theory—
offer matched savings for participants with specific asset goals in mind including 
homewonership, education, and small business development.  In addition, financial 
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education is offered to help participants gain more knowledge about available financial 
resources and to help them reach their asset goals. 
DATA 
 
Beginning in 1997, a national demonstration, known as the American Dream 
Demonstration (ADD) was initiated to test the IDA model.  ADD was the first large-scale 
test of IDAs and provides the most comprehensive data on IDAs to date.  It involved 14 
programs selected through a competitive process to design, implement, and run IDA 
programs (see Table 1).  
The study followed over 2,000 low-income (200 percent of poverty or less) 
participants across the United States for eight years (1997-2005).  Each program site 
operated their programs for four years with an additional four years of post-program 
research.  Participant enrollment began in July of 1997 and continued throughout the 
program.  Participants were defined as enrollees if they had an account statement in the 
data management program, Management Information System for Individual 
Development Accounts (MIS IDA) and included those individuals who exited the 
program without a matched withdrawal (Schreiner et al., 2002).  Program staff collected 
monitoring data with MIS IDA, which incorporated a quality control component 
(Johnson et al., 2001).  Savings data came from monthly passbook savings account 
records from depository institutions.  The socio-economic and demographic information 
used in this study was gathered at time of enrollment.  Participants were allowed to use 
their accumulated savings for home purchases, home improvements, micro-enterprise, 
retirement and education.    
 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
8
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
ADD used an extensive multi-method research design to gather as much 
information as possible concerning the effectiveness of the programs in terms of the 
communities, participants and administration in order to inform IDA policy and program 
development outside of ADD (Sherraden et al., 2000).  The largest program site, located 
in Oklahoma, used an experimental design and was the only site with a control group.  
However, because this particular study looks at institutional effects within IDA programs, 
all the ADD programs are utilized. 
For this study, two data sources both originating from ADD are used.  The first 
source comes from the data set described above.  The second source is a more detailed 
collection of program information obtained through an additional survey conducted on 
the 14 ADD programs.  The survey was administered using a combination of face-to-face 
and telephone interviews with personnel from the ADD programs.  The interview 
questions were derived based on the institutional constructs suggested in Sherraden 
(1991) and Beverly & Sherraden’s (1999) institutional theory of saving.  The survey 
consisted of both open-and closed-ended questions.  The open-ended questions were 
designed to help clarify some of the closed-ended questions.  Once completed, the 
program survey data was merged with the ADD participant data.   The total participant 
sample size for this study is 2,211.   
Dependent Variable: Saving Performance 
Saving may be measured in a variety of ways depending on which aspect of the 
process is of interest.  In this study, we use average monthly net deposit (AMND), as the 
measure of saving performance.  This measure is consistent with measures used in prior 
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research on ADD (see Sherraden et al., 2000; Schreiner et al., 2001; Schreiner et al, 2002; 
Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004). 
AMND measures the specific dollar amount of a participant’s average monthly 
deposit.  It is net deposit divided by the number of participation months, thus controlling 
for length of participation in an IDA program.  Higher AMND implies higher savings. 
AMND = Deposit + Interest-Unmatched withdrawals-Unmatchable deposits 
Total number of months of participation 
 
The variable net deposit, used to calculate AMND, is defined as deposits plus 
earned interest minus unmatched withdrawals. Net deposit includes matched 
withdrawals, but excludes unmatchable deposits in excess of the match cap 2 or after the 
time cap period. 3  Deposits over the match cap and after the time cap are excluded 
because, although the extra deposited amounts are considered savings, they are not 
considered IDA savings.  Given that participants may have other types of savings that are 
not included in the saving measure for this study, adding in the extra IDA savings might 
bias the results.  The average AMND for this study population is $18.44. 
Independent Variables: Participant Demographic and Financial Characteristics 
Participant demographic and financial characteristics are used as controls in this 
analysis.  They include age (a one joint spline dividing participants who are 40 years of 
age and younger, and those participants who are 41 years of age or older), gender, 
dependency ratio, race/ethnicity, education level, employment, marital status, rural 
residency, car ownership, home ownership, business ownership, ownership of checking 
or savings account, net worth and never on TANF (public assistance use) (see Table 2 for 
                                                 
2 Match cap is the ceiling on the matchable deposits possible for a designated time period. 
3 Time cap is the number of months after opening an account that participants are allowed matchable 
deposits. 
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details).  As mentioned earlier, all of these variables are measured at the time of 
enrollment.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
As indicate in Table 2, eighty percent of participants in ADD are female, 44 
percent are African American, 40 percent are Caucasian, and 9 percent are Hispanic.  In 
addition, 22 percent of ADD participants are married while 47 percent have never 
married and 28 percent are divorced or separated.  Fifty-eight percent of participants were 
employed full-time at baseline, 24 percent were employed part-time and 10 percent were 
unemployed.  In regard to education, 15 percent of participants do not have a high school 
diploma, 25 percent have a high school diploma, 37 percent have attended some college 
and 23 percent have a college degree.  Overall, compared to the U.S. low-income 
population, ADD participants are more likely to be female, African American, single, and 
employed as well as more educated.   
Independent Variables: Institutional Characteristics 
Access. Number of deposit locations is used to measure this concept.  It is a 
continuous variable that identifies the number of deposit locations that were available to 
participants.  The hypothesis: the greater the number of deposit locations, the greater the 
saving performance.    
Information.  Hours of financial education and peer mentoring group are the two 
variables used to measure information.  Financial education for participants was provided 
by each program individually.  Because several different options were available in each 
program, hours taken varied between the participants; therefore, hours of financial 
education is a continuous variable that provides the number of financial education hours 
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taken by each participant.  A multi-joint spline is used creating 3 different financial 
education segments: 1 to 6 hours, 7-12 hours, 13 or more hours.  In addition, a dummy 
variable was created for people with no hours of financial education.  Peer mentoring 
groups is a dichotomous variable that determines whether a program offered peer group 
mentoring programs to IDA participants in addition to financial education.   The 
hypotheses: (1) the greater the number of financial education hours attended, the greater 
the saving performance and (2) the more peer modeling and information sharing, the 
greater the saving performance.   
Incentives.  In this study, match rate is used as the measure for incentives.  Match 
rate is a continuous variable that describes the match rates offered to participants in the 
IDA programs.  The match rates ranged from 1:1 to 6:1.  For the purpose of this study, 
dummy variables are created to examine the influence of each level of match rate.  The 
variables are 1:1, 2:1, 3:1+.  The 3:1+ variable represents the match rates of 3:1 and 
above.  The hypothesis: the higher the match rate, the greater the saving performance.  
Facilitation.  This construct is measured by direct deposit, a dichotomous 
variable.  It identifies whether a program offers direct deposit to IDA participants for 
their IDA accounts.  The hypothesis: the more automatic the system (such as automatic 
deposit), the greater the saving performance. 
Expectations. Expectations is measured by monthly savings target.  Monthly 
savings target is a continuous variable that represents the ratio of total match cap to the 
time cap.  The target is a program feature set by the programs for the participants.  The 
hypothesis: the higher the monthly savings target, the greater the saving performance.  
The institutional variables are shown in Table 3. 
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 [INSTERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
To address the research question guiding this paper, a hierarchical multivariate 
analysis is utilized.  This analysis procedure examines the incremental changes of R2 in a 
regression model due to the addition of individual variables or blocks of variables 
introduced in a specified hierarchy at certain points in the regression (Cohen & Cohen, 
1983).  Specifically, the measure of saving performance, AMND, is regressed on three 
blocks of independent variables.  The first block (model 1) consists of the individual 
participant characteristics and is entered into the model to determine the variance 
explained in AMND without the institutional variables added.  The measurable 
institutional variables block is introduced in the second model (model 2) to determine the 
influence of each of these characteristics on saving performance as well as their unique 
contribution as a block to the incremental changes in the variance explained in AMND 
when controlling for participant characteristics.  In the third block (model 3), program 
dummies, which are unmeasured institutional characteristics, are entered to determine 
their unique contribution to variance explained in AMND.  
 The specified hierarchy of this regression model is guided by the theoretical 
framework of this study.  Based on the institutional explanation of saving behavior, when 
institutionalized mechanisms for saving are made available to low-income households, 
saving performance will increase in these households.  Therefore, it is presumed that 
when institutional characteristics are added to the model as a second block, the proportion 
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of variance explained will increase significantly from the first block containing only 
participant characteristics.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Univariate Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics were calculated on participant demographic and financial 
characteristics as well as institutional characteristics. The full results are reported in 
Table 2 and Table 3 above.   
Multivariate Analysis  
As noted earlier, traditional theories of saving do not specifically address saving 
in low-income households nor do they stress the role institutions play in influencing 
saving and asset accumulation.  Using institutional theory, this paper seeks to contribute 
to the emerging research on the role of institutions in individual asset accumulation.  In 
particular, this paper seeks to specify and test the institutional mechanisms that affect 
saving performance in low-income households in IDA programs.  In identifying an 
institutional approach to saving, each of the existing theories might be integrated into a 
coherent theory that also helps explain saving in low-income households. 
 Consistent with the institutional theory of saving the results suggest that 
institutional characteristics are important in the saving behavior of low-income 
households.  Below is a discussion of the major findings.  The results begin with the 
individual participant and institutional characteristics and then report on the institutional 
block results.  The institutional variables entered into the model as a block provide a 
better understanding of the variance explained—in saving performance—by institutional 
characteristics as a whole. 
Participant Demographic Characteristics  
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Gender, age, marital status, and dependency ratio are not significantly associated 
with saving performance (see Table 4 for complete regression results). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Race/ethnicity.  Three categories of race have a significant association with 
saving performance.  Holding other variables in the model constant, compared with 
Caucasians, AMND is $3.33 lower for African Americans (b= -3.33, p≤ 0.01) and $6.78 
lower for Native Americans (b= -6.78, p≤ 0.01); whereas AMND for Asians is $14.08 
higher (b= 14.08, p≤ 0.01).  This finding may partly be a reflection of the institutional 
discrimination based on race or other differences.  In any case, although some racial 
groups are saving less than others, the main idea here is that all racial groups are saving 
and would even probably do better given more institutional opportunities.  Thus, 
enforcing inclusive policies like the community reinvestment act (12 U.S.C. 2901, 
implemented by regulations 12 CFR parts 25; 228; 345, and 563e) may be helpful in 
ensuring that racial minorities more access to institutional forms of saving and asset 
accumulation. 
Education.  Education is significantly related to saving performance.  Compared 
to those participants who have a college degree (2-year, 4-year, or unspecified), all other 
categories are linked with a statistically significant lower AMND.  For example, 
participants without a high school diploma save $4.45 less than participants with a 
college degree (b= -4.45, p≤ 0.01), participants with a high school diploma or GED save 
$4.65 less than participants with a college degree (b= -4.65, p≤ 0.01), and participants 
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with some college save $4.00 less than participants with a college degree (b= -4.00, p≤ 
0.01).  This relationship may exist because either more education increases financial 
sophistication or that increased education as a form of human capital demonstrates future 
orientation.   
Employment.  Only one employment category is significantly associated with 
saving performance.  Students are linked with a $5.99 increase in AMND compared to 
participants who are unemployed (b= 5.99, p≤ 0.01).    One explanation for this 
occurrence could be that students may use part of their grant money or student loans to 
deposit into their IDAs in lump sums.  There may also be some unobserved 
characteristics related to students that predispose them more to saving than other groups 
of people.  For example, students may be more focused toward the future and more savvy 
about saving.  There are no significant differences on saving performance between 
unemployed participants (the reference group) and those employed full time, or those 
employed part-time. 
Rural residency.  Rural residency has a significant relationship with saving 
performance.  AMND was $5.11 less for participants residing in rural areas compared to 
participants living in urban areas (b= -5.11, p≤ 0.01).   Grinstein-Weiss and Curley 
(2003) report two main challenges that may influence saving outcomes in rural areas.  
First, because of the lack of infrastructure in many rural areas, fewer resources are 
available to participants in terms of the availability, quality, and flexibility of options, 
services, and staff connected with IDAs.  Second, distance is an issue.  For participants 
who live outside of town, attending financial education classes is sometimes a problem 
because they either lack transportation or do not have enough time to get from work to 
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class because of the distance.  Moreover, the transaction costs involved in depositing may 
be higher for rural participants because of the distance issue.   
Participant Financial Characteristics 
 Never on TANF, business ownership, income and net worth are all not 
significantly related to saving performance (see Tables 4 for complete regression results).  
Car ownership.  Car ownership is significantly linked to saving performance. Car 
owners were linked with a $2.27 higher AMND compared to participants who were not 
car owners (b= 2.27, p≤ 0.05). 
Home ownership.  Owning a home has a significant and positive relationship with 
saving performance.  Homeowners show a $7.22 higher AMND than those participants 
who do not own their own homes (b= 7.22, p≤ 0.01). 
Checking or Savings Account.  Having either a checking or savings account or 
both is significantly related to saving performance.  Participants with either a checking 
account, savings account or both were associated with over $3 higher in AMND (b=3.40, 
p≤ 0.01) than participants who had neither account.   
The findings in this study indicate that owning certain forms of assets may be 
predictive of saving performance in IDAs.  As Sherraden (1991) observes, owning assets 
may, “create a cognitive and emotional orientation towards the future and stimulate the 
development of other assets” (p.181).   Under these assumptions, the initial possession of 
assets helps provide a foundation that may encourage greater asset accumulation in the 
future.  It may also be that ownership of other assets is a proxy for successful financial 
functioning that is long-standing.   
Institutional Characteristics  
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 IDAs are formal institutions that are purposely designed to encourage and 
facilitate saving and asset accumulation in low-income households.  Therefore, the 
characteristics that comprise the structure of these institutions should demonstrate a 
significant relationship to participants’ saving outcomes.  Results of this study, in part, 
support this postulation.  Table 4 presents the detailed regression results for the 
institutional characteristics.  Below is a summary of those results. 
Access.  The findings do not support the hypothesis related to access: the greater 
the number of deposit locations, the greater the saving performance.  Number of deposit 
locations is not significantly related to saving performance. 
Information.   The findings support both hypotheses related to information: (1) the 
more peer modeling and information sharing, the greater the saving performance; and (2) 
the greater the number of financial education hours attended, the greater the saving 
performance.  For those participants who are in programs that offer peer mentoring 
groups, AMND is $8.19 higher than for participants in programs that do not have peer 
mentoring groups (b= 8.19, p≤ 0.01).  The positive association with peer mentoring 
groups is an indication that peer encouragement, support, and sharing the challenges and 
experiences of the saving process with other participants may be useful.  These findings 
are consistent with Ssewamala and Sherraden (2004) and with the survey of rural IDA 
programs (Grinstein-Weiss & Curley, 2003).  
 Moreover, the amount of financial education hours attended by participants is 
significantly associated with saving performance in two categories.  Having attended 
between 1 and 6 hours of financial education and having attended between 7 and 12 
hours of financial education is significantly associated with AMND.  Specifically, for 
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each additional hour attended between 1 and 6, AMND increases by $1.23 (b= 1.23, p≤ 
0.05).  For each additional hour between 7 and 12, AMND increases by $1.76 (b= 1.76, 
p≤ 0.01).  On the other hand, having 13 or more hours of financial education is not 
significantly linked to saving performance.  These findings support earlier research on 
financial education in ADD (Schreiner et al., 2001; Schreiner et al., 2002; Ssewamala & 
Sherraden, 2004).  Thus, programs should design financial education requirements 
accordingly.  For example, to maximize the benefits for participants and minimize their 
own costs, programs could provide a combination of formal financial education up to 
approximately12 hours and establish peer mentoring programs.  With this alternative, 
participants could receive factual financial information from the classes and emotional 
support and encouragement from the peer mentoring programs.   
  Incentives.  The results do not support the incentive hypothesis: the higher the 
match rate, the greater the saving performance.  The measure of incentives used in this 
study, match rates, is not significantly associated with AMND. 
Based on these findings, the idea that, according to economic theory, higher 
match rates are an incentive to save more is not substantiated.  One explanation could be 
that programs in ADD set match rates based on how they think participants will save.  
For example, programs may set match rates higher if they think participants may save 
less.  With this approach, participants can still reach their total asset goal because the 
higher match rates allows them a higher match amount and, thus, higher total 
accumulation.  Another explanation is the income effect.  Participants might set an end 
goal and if the match rate is higher they can save less and still reach their goal.  In 
general, empirical evidence concerning the effects of incentives is inconsistent (Engen, 
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Gale & Scholz, 1996; Hubbard & Skinner, 1996; Poterba, Venti & Wise, 1996).  Perhaps 
IDA programs should implement additional education to help participants understand the 
benefits connected to higher match rates with increased deposits.  Another alternative 
could be to establish moderate match rates in programs, thus freeing up funds that could 
be used more efficiently in other areas of the program, such as allowing for additional 
account holders or increasing match caps.   
Facilitation. The hypothesis related to facilitation is not supported: the more 
automatic the system (such as automatic deposit), the greater the saving performance.  
The measure of facilitation used here, direct deposit, is not significantly associated with 
saving performance. 
Expectation.  The expectation hypothesis is supported: the higher the monthly 
savings target, the greater the saving performance.  For every additional $1 in monthly 
savings target, AMND increases by $0.25 (b= 0.25, p≤ 0.01).   
These results support institutional theory which suggests that higher match caps 
may be associated with higher saving performance because participants mentally convert 
match caps into goals (see Schreiner et al., 2001).  Using this knowledge, program 
administrators may want to emphasize specific objectives and guidelines in their 
programs to provide some assistance in maintaining saving goals for participants.  
Policymakers and program administrators should concentrate on the right mixture of 
conventions to help shape and support participants saving, not mandate it.   
Estimated “Block” Contributions to Changes in R2  
 The results of the hierarchical analysis which regress the dependent variable on 
the three blocks of independent variables are presented below (see Table 5). 
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[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
As indicated in Table 5, when the block of participant characteristics only are 
entered into the first model (model 1), the variance explained in AMND is 16 percent (R2 
= 0.16).  After the institutional characteristic block is introduced (model 2), the variance 
explained increases to 28 percent (R2 = 0.28), indicating a change in R2 of 0.12 or 12 
percent.  This change is the unique contribution of the measurable institutional 
characteristics to the overall model.  The change is statistically significant (p≤ 0.01).   
These results suggest that institutions are important. Furthermore, when program 
dummies (unmeasured program characteristics) are added, R2 significantly increases by 
another 3 percent.  This change is also statistically significant (p≤ 0.01), indicating that 
unobserved program variables are related to saving outcomes, which are most likely 
aspects of the IDA programs.  These variables might include strong leadership, staff 
commitment, staff skill, and other factors.  The total variance explained by all three 
blocks of independent variables in model 3 is 31 percent (R2 = 0.31). 
LIMITATIONS 
The following limitations are worth highlighting.  Institutional designs of the IDA 
programs were not randomly assigned which meant that programs could select their own 
design plan, based in part on how they perceived participants’ behavior.  In addition, 
participants were not randomly chosen to participate.  Most of the IDA programs targeted 
certain populations; Therefore, the results do not reflect the overall low-income 
population.  Another limitation is that the socio-economic and participant characteristics 
used in this study were collected at enrollment and some of them may have changed 
during the course of the program.  Again, as mentioned earlier, no comparison group was 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
21
available for all sites. The absence of a comparable control group in this study makes it 
impossible to say with confidence that study results are due to IDAs or that IDAs 
represent new saving for the household.  Lastly, this analysis is based on a short-term 
study period.  We cannot determine long-term effects without a longer study period.   
CONCLUSION 
 Evidence from ADD indicates that the poor can save.  Sufficient evidence exists 
to support the creation of institutional mechanisms to encourage the poor to save.  In fact, 
because of the institutional aspects of ADD, many low-income households were given 
the opportunity to save.  However, it is not known how many will continue to save once 
the program has ended and the saving mechanisms are gone.  Looking at the same 
situation in a different perspective the question could be asked of higher-income 
households: How many upper-income households would save if no institutional 
mechanisms for saving opportunities existed for them?  In other words, how many people 
could or would accumulate savings if there were no 401k plans or IRAs available to 
them?   
Since the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (the “welfare reform” law), which gave states the option to 
use funds from their block grants for matched saving accounts for the poor without 
counting the savings toward means-tested programs asset limits, IDAs have grown 
considerably.  Over 40 US states have adopted some type of IDA policy (Edwards and 
Mason, 2003).  The Corporation for Enterprise Development [CFED] (2002) estimates 
that by 2002, there were more than 500 IDA programs throughout the United States. 
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Results from this study can help policymakers understand the role of institutions, 
and create more successful programs to promote saving and asset accumulation among 
populations that generally do not have access to institutionalized saving mechanisms.  
Tax incentives are already in place to encourage small businesses to locate in 
economically distressed areas and promote economic development.  These types of 
incentives are designed to build assets within low-income communities by creating 
affordable housing and stimulating job growth in these regions.  Additional incentives 
could help support asset development at the individual level.  For example, policy 
initiatives could be introduced to increase funding for IDAs or provide stronger tax 
incentives to businesses that match pension accounts for low-income workers.  
Results could also enable policymakers to make more informed decisions 
regarding mechanisms to encourage saving under different circumstances, such as in  
different population groups or different geographical locations.  The ethnicity findings in 
this study may represent unobserved characteristics associated with race rather than race 
itself. More research should be conducted to determine the specific predictors for each 
group so that policymakers can provide the appropriate policy and program designs to 
enable each group the opportunity to save more efficiently.  For example, incentives 
might be given to organizations that target a particular low-income minority group.   
Similar to the results with race, findings that point to unique predictors among 
different geographic groups can help policymakers design policy and incentives directed 
purposely at these specific groups to encourage savings.  For example, special tax 
incentives could be given to organizations that participate in IDA programs in rural areas 
in order to increase funding opportunities in these regions.   
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Lastly, empirical evidence provided by studies of this nature may foster interest 
and awareness in existing tax policies that are regressive in nature.  Policymakers could 
make these policies more inclusive so that low-income households could benefit from 
them.  More refundable tax credits for low-income households would be one mechanism 
that could help.  This type of policy would avoid the social stigma associated with 
programs that are targeted specifically to the poor.    
In summary, institutional constructs appear to affect saving performance in IDA 
programs.  These results, drawaing on institutional theories of saving, have direct 
implications for policy as well as practice.  IDAs and similar policies and practices can 
probably be improved based on this growing body of evidence.  Much more remains to 
be done in both theoretical development and empirical research for inclusive saving and 
asset accumulation to reach its potential. 
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Table 1.  Host organizations in ADD.
Host Organization Location Type of Organization Targeted Participants for IDAs
ADVOCAP Fond du Lac, WI Community action agency Former AFDC/TANF recipients; the 
working poor
Alternatives Federal 
Credit Union
Ithaca, NY Community development credit 
union
Single parents; youth
Bay Area IDA 
Collaborative (formerly 
EBALDC)
Oakland, CA Collaborative of 13 community-
based organizations
Low-income Asian Americans; 
African Americans; Hispanics
Capital Area Asset 
Building Corporation 
(CAAB)
Washington, D.C. Collaborative of 8 community-
based organizations
TANF recipients; youth; African 
Americans; Hispanics; Asian 
Americans 
Foundation Communities 
(formerly Central Texas 
Mutual Housing)
Austin, TX Not-for-profit housing 
organization
Rental property residents; youth
Central Vermont 
Community Action 
Council (CVCAC)
Barre, VT Community action agency and 
community development 
corporation
TANF recipients; youth
Community Action 
Project of Tulsa County 
(CAPTC)
Tulsa, OK Community-based anti-poverty 
organization
Small-scale: Working families with 
children at or below 200% of 
poverty.                        
Large-scale: at or below 150% of 
Heart of America Family 
Services
Kansas City, MO Community-based family-
services agency
Hispanics; African Americans
Mercy Corps           
(formerly Human 
Solutions)
Portland, OR Social-service organization Rental property residents
MACED/Owsley County 
Action Team
Berea, KY Association of community 
development organizations
Rental property residents; the 
working poor
Near Eastside IDA 
Program
Indianapolis, IN Social-service organization / 
Community development credit 
union
Neighborhood residents; youth
Shorebank Corporation Chicago, IL Community development bank 
with not-for-profit affiliate
Rental property residents; Shorebank 
customers
Women’s Self-
Employment Project 
(WSEP)
Chicago, IL Microenterprise development 
organization
Low-income, self-employed women; 
public-housing residents
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Table 2.  ADD participant characteristics. 
Mean
Characteristics (St. Dev.) Percentage
Demographics
Gender
  Female 80%
  Male 20%
Age 36 (10)
  13 to 19 4%
  20s 26%
  30s 36%
  40s 25%
  50s 7%
  60 to 72 2%
Race/Ethnicity
  African American 44%
  Asian-American or Pacific Islander 2%
  Caucasian 40%
  Hispanic 9%
  Native American 3%
  Other 3%
Marital Status
  Never Married 47%
  Married 22%
  Divorced or Separated 28%
  Widowed 2%
Education
  No High School Diploma 15%
  High School Diploma or GED 25%
  Attended Some College 37%
  College Degree 23%
Employment
  Employed Full-time 58%
  Employed Part-time 24%
  Student 8%
  Unemployed 10%
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Table 2.  ADD participant characteristics continued. 
Mean
Characteristics (St. Dev.) Percentage
Household
Household Type
  One Adult with Children 45%
  One Adult without Children 15%
  Two or more Adults with Children 30%
  Two or more Adults/No Children 9%
Dependency Ratio 2.3 (1.24)
Rural Residency 14%
Financial 
Car Ownership 67%
Home Ownership 17%
Business Ownership 11%
Either Checking or Savings Account 77%
Never Used TANF 61%
Monthly Income $1,364 (7.01)
Income to Poverty Ratio 105 (.68)
  0 to 49 20%
  50 to 74 13%
  75 to 99 16%
  100 to 124 14%
  125 to 149 12%
  150 to 174 9%
  175 to 199 6%
  200 to 327 8%
Net Worth $3,136 (194)
N 2,211
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Table 3.   ADD institutional characteristics. 
Mean
Institutional Characteristics (St. Dev.) Percentage
Access
  Number of Deposit Locations 17 (21.56)
Information
  Peer Mentoring Groups 34%
  Hours of Financial Education Attended 10 (7.57)
  0 Hours 9%
  1-6 Hours 15%
  7-12 Hours 50%
  Over 13 Hours 24%
Incentives
  Match Rate 2 (.91) 
    1:1 27%
    2:1 51%
    3:1 and Over 21%
Facilitation
  Program Offered Direct Deposit 80%
Expectations
  Monthly Savings Target $42.14 (20.47)
N 2,211
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Table 4.  Hierarchical regression analysis: Individual and institutional Characteristics
 and Average Monthly Net Deposit (AMND).
Model 1 Model 2
Independent Variables b se b se
Intercept #### ** 3.80 #### * 5.00
Participant Characteristics: 
Demographics
Female -1.20 1.23 -1.09 1.16
Age
    40 or under 0.17 * 0.08 0.06 0.08
    Over 40 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.10
Race/Ethnicity
    Caucasian (reference group) 
    African American -7.13 ** 1.12 -3.33 ** 1.12
    Hispanic 2.78 1.76 4.51 1.68
    Asian-American or Pacific Islander #### ** 3.24 14.08 ** 3.03
    Native American -6.82 * 2.78 -6.78 ** 2.59
    Other Ethnicity 2.93 2.76 5.08 2.59
Education
    Completed a Degree (reference group) 
    No High School Diploma -7.28 ** 1.62 -4.45 ** 1.52
    High School Diploma or GED -6.86 ** 1.35 -4.65 ** 1.27
    Attended Some College -5.13 ** 1.22 -4.00 ** 1.14
Employment
    Unemployed (reference group) 
    Employed Full-time 1.36 1.61 -0.78 1.54
    Employed Part-time 2.87 1.70 0.78 1.60
    Student 5.03 * 2.15 5.99 ** 2.01
Marital 
    Married (reference group)
    Single - Never Married -1.27 1.32 -0.86 1.24
    Divorced, Separated, or Widowed 0.02 1.39 0.30 1.30
Dependency Ratio -0.49 0.42 -0.66 0.39
Rural Residency -4.16 ** 1.41 -5.11 ** 1.43
 
 
 
 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
32
Table 4.  Hierarchical regression analysis: Individual and institutional Characteristics
 and Average Monthly Net Deposit (AMND) continued.
Model 1 Model 2
Independent Variables b se b se
Participant Characteristics: Financial
Asset Ownership
    Car 3.61 ** 1.07 2.27 * 1.01
    Home 6.30 ** 1.46 7.22 ** 1.41
    Business 1.90 1.48 0.79 1.41
    Checking or Savings Account 6.24 ** 1.16 3.40 ** 1.10
Never on TANF -0.12 1.02 0.44 0.96
Monthly Income 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.07
Net Worth -2.08 1.39 0.00 0.00
Institutional Characteristics
Number of Deposit Locations (access) 0.03 0.03
Peer Mentoring Groups (information) 8.19 ** 1.16
Financial Education (information)
    0 Education Hours  -0.15 3.28
    1 to 6 Education Hours 1.23 * 0.56
    7 to 12 Education Hours 1.76 ** 0.26
    13 or more Education Hours 0.01 0.09
Match Rate (incentives)
      1:1  (reference group)
      2:1 -1.67 1.18
      3:1 and Higher -2.06 1.63
Direct Deposit (facilitation) 0.64 1.40
Monthly Savings Target (expectations) 0.25 ** 0.03
R2 0.16 0.28
N #### ####
 *p≤ .05  **p≤ .01
b = unstandardized coefficient
se = standard error  
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 Table 5. Hierarchical regression results: Influence of institutional characteristics on 
 Average Monthly Net Deposit (AMND).
Adjusted
Model R2 R2 R2 ∆
Model 1: 0.16 0.15
Individual Characteristics
Gender, age, race, education, employment, 
marital status, dependency ratio, residency,
asset ownership, banking experience,
TANF use,  monthly income, and net worth.
Model 2: 0.28 0.27 0.12 **
Individual Characteristics + Institutional 
Charateristics
# of deposit locations, peer mentoring groups,
financial education attended, match rate,
direct deposit offered, monthly savings target
Model 3: 0.31 0.29 0.03 **
Individual Characteristics + Institutional 
Charateristics + Program Dummies
ADVOCAP, Alternative federal Credit Union,
Bay Area IDA Collaborative, Central Vermont 
Community Action Council, Community Action 
Project of Tulsa, OK, Foundation Communities, 
Heart of America Family Services, Mercy Corps, 
MACED, Near Eastside IDA Program, Shorebank 
Corporation, Women's Self-Employment Project.
N 2
  **p≤ .01
,211
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